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Despite growing appreciation in recent decades of the importance of shared intentional 
mental states as a foundation for everything from divergences in primate evolution, to the 
institution of communal norms, to trends in the development of modernity as a socio-
political phenomenon, we lack an adequate understanding of the relationship between 
individual and shared intentionality.  At the same time, it is widely appreciated that deontic 
reasoning concerning what ought, may, and ought not be done is, like reasoning about our 
intentions, an exercise of practical rationality.  Taking advantage of this fact, I use a plan-
theoretic semantics for the deontic modalities as a basis for understanding individual and 
shared intentions.  This results in a view that accords well with what we currently have 
reason to believe about the phylogenetic and ontogenetic development of norm psychology 
and shared intentionality in human beings, and where original intentionality can be 
understood in terms of the shared intentionality of a community. 
Keywords:  collective intentionality, deontic modality, practical rationality 
 
I  Shared Intentionality as a Theme of Modern Philosophy 
One way of telling the story of modernity, as a social or political phenomenon, is that it 
involved a dawning recognition of the power of shared or collective intentional agency as a 
means of shaping who we are and how we see the world.  As a tour through modern 
philosophy, this telling might include discussion of Rousseau’s conception of the General 
Will (cf. Miller and Tuomela 2014, and Tuomela 2013:  94-6), Kant’s understanding of the 
Categorical Imperative as the demand to constitute a universal kingdom of ends (1996:  83ff.), 
Hegel’s claim that “the experience of what Spirit is” arises as the recognition of an “‘I’ that is 
‘we’ and a ‘we’ that is ‘I’” (1977:  110), Peirce’s view that the identities of individual persons 
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have their ground in the universal community of inquiry (cf. Burgh et al. 2006 chapter 2), and 
Wilfrid Sellars’ effort, which he understood as working out ideas in Kant and Peirce, to 
characterize the moral frame of mind as a species of shared intentionality (e.g. 1951, 1963, 
1968, 1976).  Prominent contemporary examinations of the ground of social reality in shared 
intentionality include Gilbert (2014), Searle (1995, 2010), Tuomela (2007, 2013), and the 
essays in Schmitt (2003a), Schmitz (2013), and part VI of Jankovic and Ludwig (2018).  
Owing to increased interest over shared intentionality in recent Anglophone philosophy, and 
in related areas of evolutionary anthropology, developmental psychology, and the social 
sciences, a story of this sort offers the prospect of relating major trends in the modern period 
to contemporary debates about human thought and agency in the sciences and the humanities, 
by using developments in one field to shed light on work in others.   
In the contemporary philosophical literature on shared intentionality, one of the 
recurring questions concerns whether and in what sense shared intentions can be reduced to 
individual intentions (for representative discussions see Birch 2018, Bratman 2014 chapters 1 
and 6, Ludwig 2016 chapters 9-12, Schweikard and Schmid 2013 section 3, and Tuomela 
2013 chapter 2).  The effort to provide some such reduction is often connected to a felt need 
to avoid reifying collective minds as bearers of mental states.  More-or-less overt ontological 
reification occurs across much of this literature; the full passage from Hegel partially quoted 
above, for instance, reads: 
 
What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is—this absolute 
substance which is the unity of the independent self-consciousnesses which, in their 
opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence:  ‘I’ that is ‘we’ and ‘we’ that is ‘I’.2 
                                                          
2 Was für das Bewußtsein weiter wird, ist die Erfahrung, was der Geist ist, diese absolute Substanz, welche in 
der vollkommenen Freiheit und Selbstständigkeit ihres Gegensatzes, nämlich verschiedener für sich seiender 





To disarm the apparent reference to collective minds that talk of shared or collective mental 
states seems to involve, philosophers often try to reduce any apparent mindedness in a 
collective to the mindedness of its members, trading the tendency toward what Schmitt 
(2003b) calls supraindividualism for a tendency toward individualism.  Meanwhile, some 
philosophers hold that even if there are no irreducibly collective minds there are irreducibly 
collective mental states (cf. the discussion of we-mode intentionality in Tuomela 2007 and 
2013, and Miller 2014).  The bearers of these mental states may be individuals, but as mental 
states they are essentially collective (views that tolerate more supraindividualist perspectives 
include Gilbert 1989 and 2000, List and Pettit 2011, Pettit 2003, Schmid 2018, Schmitt 
2003b, and Searle 1995).   
Despite the variety in their views, two commitments common across much of this 
literature contribute to worries about supraindividualism.  First, philosophers tend to model 
theories of shared intentionality on theories of individual intentionality:  starting with an 
antecedent understanding of the latter, the capacities thought operative there are repurposed to 
account for shared intentions (e.g. Bratman 2014:  14 and 128-30, and Ludwig 2018:  477).  
Chant (2018) calls this the “wash, rinse, and repeat” (WRR) approach.  From p.14: 
Employing WRR as a method for analyzing group-level concepts such as collective 
intention is to imply a kind of isomorphism between theories of individual action and 
theories of collective action.  The isomorphism is between the respective sets of individual- 
and group-level concepts (e.g. “individual agent” and “collective agent”), and the 
explanatory relationships between them.  Taking on WRR is tantamount to assuming that if 
there is an explanatory relationship between two individual-level concepts, there should be 
a corresponding pair of collective-level concepts bearing the same explanatory relationship 




Alongside this first framing commitment, debates about shared minds have been shaped by 
representational analyses provided for sentences like “we built the house together” and “the 
homeowner’s association is responsible for the change in policy”.  These sentences are 
thought to be true just in case certain conditions hold, and they are semantically evaluated as 
representations of these truth conditions (e.g. in Bratman 2014 chapter 4, Ludwig 2007, 2014, 
and chapters 12 and 13 of 2016, and Tuomela and Miller 1988).  We gain a rather different 
view of shared intentionality if we trade these two commitments for, in the first instance, an 
analogical rather than isomorphic understanding of shared intentionality, and in the second 
instance an analysis of the sentences that give expression to shared intentions rather than 
those that purport to report on or represent their existence. 
The first shift might not seem that significant.  Although Chant characterizes WRR as 
an isomorphic understanding of shared intentions on the basis of an understanding of 
individual intentions, it is not uncommon to see philosophers frame their accounts in terms of 
analogical relationships between the two domains (e.g. Bratman 2014:  10 and 30-1, and 
Tuomela 2007:  140).  For this reason, I think we should understand Chant as diagnosing a 
tendency or trend in recent philosophy rather than an explicit or universally exemplified 
commitment.  The important point, for both her and myself, is that some of the troublesome 
ontological puzzles philosophers have faced are artifacts of the modelling methods prevalent 
in the contemporary literature.  I will argue that we can solve, or dissolve, some of these 
puzzles by thinking more explicitly about the analogical character of our models. 
Work in the philosophy of science over the last half-century has equipped us with a set 
of protocols for the critical application of analogical reasoning in theory construction (cf. 
Bartha 2010, Genter 1983, Gentner, Holyoak, and Nakinov 2001, and Hesse 1952 and 1966).  
In its general form, we use an antecedent understanding of one domain of inquiry (the 




After identifying hallmark features of the analogical base and target that are situated in similar 
networks of operation (causal, geometrical, conceptual, etc.), we give a commentary on the 
sorts of relations in the base that can be inferred to hold among the correlate relations in the 
target.  While there must be some structural similarity between the analogical base and target 
if the analogy is to get off the ground—consider the sun at the center of the solar system and 
the nucleus at the center of the atom—much of the explanatory value of analogical reasoning 
derives from the commentary one gives concerning which inferences can be drawn from base 
to target.  The solar system model of the atom concerns geometrical relationships, and in the 
commentary we block the inference that nuclei irradiate electromagnetic energy on the basis 
of gravity-induced nuclear fusion.  Just so, an analogical understanding of shared 
intentionality may include a commentary sufficient to defuse it of the charge that it reifies the 
group into some kind of supraindividual mind.  Metaphysical concerns may be avoided from 
the beginning, by simply not importing the relevant explanatory resources from base to target.   
Analogical reasoning has the additional benefit of helping reframe our understanding 
of a subject matter that may be otherwise difficult to comprehend.  Using an initial model 
drawn from the base, we investigate the analogical target to see whether the hypothesized 
relations posited from our reading of the base are present there.  Over the course of the 
investigation, we update the model according to what we discover about the target domain.  
As a consequence of this revisionary process, an analogical conception of the relationship 
between two domains may reorient how we understand the very things whose metaphysical 
status we dispute.  In one of its forms, analogical reasoning about two different domains 
allows us to construct a more general category that subsumes them both (cf. general theories 
of teleological systems derived from Darwinian accounts of biology; for discussion see 
Stovall 2015).  This capacity to change our understanding of a target of inquiry led Hegel to 




subsequently assimilate to abduction, and both philosophers thought this form of reasoning 
was at the core of scientific and philosophical inquiry—for Hegel, it involved the ability to 
reason with universal terms as middle terms in a syllogistic inference, and so it constituted our 
grasp of universality as the most general kind of thinking (see Redding 2003 and Stovall 
Forthcoming A).  They also thought this form of reasoning was going to be instrumental for 
the advance of intellectual and social projects rooted in the modern period, and at the end of 
the essay I will suggest that we heirs of modernity can still profit from this way of thinking. 
Concerning the second shift in commitment I take on here, recent debates have been 
unduly influenced by the thought that the mind’s core task is to represent the world.  Much of 
what we do is not strictly representational but agency-involving, and meant to change the 
world instead of describe it.  Representational capacities are involved in action, of course, but 
that is not so say a claim like “we are going to the park this afternoon” or “you should be 
more polite to your neighbors” purports to represent a fact—it may instead be to rehearse an 
intention, or a call for another to do the same.  This distinction has its correlate in the 
organism.  Sensory and motor neural pathways are physiologically distinct structures, each 
carrying its own intentionality and direction of fit:  cognitive operations of the former are 
successful or correct when the mind ‘fits’ or corresponds to the world, whereas the operations 
of the latter are successful when the world fits the mind.  Cases of mind-world fitness may be 
conceived in exclusively representational terms with a tolerable degree of accuracy, but an 
adequate understanding of world-mind fitness requires the categories of practical rationality.  
And we can recognize this point without losing sight of the fact that we in some sense 
represent intentional facts when we say, e.g., that we built the house together.  
At any rate, the philosopher is not required to begin studying shared intentionality 
through a truth-conditional analysis of sentences that appear to report on the existence of 




we orient ourselves along the representational and truth-conditional dimensions of linguistic 
activity.  Instead, if we are interested in shared intentional states of mind we should pay 
attention to the sentences used to give voice to shared intentions.  Consequently, rather than 
propose truth conditions for sentences like ‘we built the house together’ I will offer an 
analysis of the semantic content of sentences like ‘we shall build the house together’, where 
the modal term ‘shall’ connotes the expression of an intention rather than a claim about its 
existence.  This is a shift from a truth-conditional mind-world analysis of shared intentions to 
a plan-conditional world-mind analysis.  More specifically, I propose we understand shared 
intentional mental states by analogy with the mental states associated with deontic judgments 
giving voice to what people ought, may, and ought not do, and I will use a planning semantics 
to understand both the intentional and the deontic modalities.  This analogy is motivated by 
the observation that practical rationality is operative as a hallmark feature of both kinds of 
cognition, and my claim is that these frames of mind alike involve planning on how one 
would behave were one any member of the relevant community.   
 
II  Background and Outline3 
I want to begin by addressing two sets of worries one might have at the outset.  First, it might 
be thought that the use of logical tools as a basis for investigating the nature of cognition was 
the resuscitation of a kind of metaphysical speculation that had long died out, to the benefit of 
our intellectual and scientific ecosystem.  Here I want to emphasize two things and encourage 
the reader to keep them in mind in what follows.  First, the model presented below is 
probative and subject to revision.  I do not supply the final answers on what I discuss, and I 
try to use the formalism as a tool to help clarify what seem like otherwise plausible views 
about human cognition.  Second, the empirical study of human cognition is at least as relevant 
                                                          




a source of model construction as the formal details that motivate my commitments here, and 
I strive to keep the discussion consonant with and informed by empirical work (more on this 
in a moment).  As a second concern, one might worry that in an essay of this length the 
treatments of these ideas will be too quick and superficial to carry the full weight of the 
claims placed on them.  Here I concede guilt while appealing to material that develops the 
view elsewhere.4  And because this essay is a more-or-less philosophical investigation into the 
relationship between intentionality and deontic cognition, the social-scientific and 
evolutionary background is kept out of view entirely.  In part to allay worries that my 
approach here is either too formalist or too superficial, then, it may do to say something about 
that background now. 
In the last three decades, the empirical study of shared intentionality has developed 
into a burgeoning field of research across the behavioral, psychological, social, and 
evolutionary sciences.  This work has begun to frame a picture of ourselves as 
paradigmatically norm-tracking, norm-enforcing, and collectively intentional animals (see 
Schmidt and Rakoczy 2018, and Tomasello, et al. 2005 for overviews).  While there is some 
evidence for coordinated activity that might be thought of as shared intentionality in non-
human animals, from an early age human beings exhibit a range of shared and norm-enforcing 
behaviors unlike what is generally seen in even our closest primate relatives:  before their first 
birthday human infants appear to understand human-like movements as goal directed, and 
around their first birthday they begin to share attention and emotions with other humans 
(Tomasello 2005:  688-9); between 12 and 18 months human infants show a tendency to 
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engage in both instrumental and playful cooperation (Schmidt and Rakoczy 2018:  698); by 
the age of 3 children distinguish a range of features of the normative landscape, including the 
distinction between conventions and moral norms (where the former depend on the agreement 
of the community; see Chudek and Henrich 2011); by this age they also recognize that the 
entitlement to do something induces commitments of non-interference by others (Schmidt et 
al. 2013), and they enforce norms on others (Rakoczy et al. 2008); between the ages of 3 and 
5 children gain the ability to better cooperate in a shared activity by swapping roles with other 
people, an ability that chimpanzees appear not to possess (Fletcher et al. 2012); and by the age 
of 5 they spontaneously create and enforce norms when interacting with others (Göckeritz et 
al. 2014).   So it appears human cognition is intimately connected to both deontic judgment 
and shared intentionality.  From a physiological standpoint, there is good reason to treat these 
forms of cognition as involving multiperspective planning states.  In the 1990s the motor-
representation complex of the central nervous system in macaque monkeys was shown to be 
operative both when the monkey performs various activities and when the monkey observes 
others perform them (see Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2010 for an overview).  It is as if the 
observer monkey was putting itself into the position of the observed and preparing to act from 
that point of view.  Since then, we have discovered that this system is present across much of 
the animal kingdom.  Work on the mirror system went through a period of intense 
popularization in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science during the first decade 
of the third millennium, and it has occasionally been put to use in philosophical accounts of 
shared intentionality as well (Butterfill 2015 and 2018, and Tuomela 2007:  69-74, 268 fn.35, 
and 297 fn.26).   
The formalism I defend is informed by the view that norm psychology and shared 
intentionality are characteristic features of human cognition, and that shared intentionality is 




coordination across a community.  I say ‘partially’ because mirroring in the motor-
representation complex is at best a (naturally) necessary rather than a sufficient condition for 
some kinds of shared intentionality:  it was perhaps a condition on its evolution in human 
beings, not something that must be present in every case of shared intentionality.  For many 
animals exhibit motor-representational mirroring, but shared intentionality appears to be very 
rare in the animal kingdom—so mirroring is not sufficient for shared intentionality.  And it is 
not necessary, as we can settle a business decision by conference call or decide as a nation to 
go to war with very little in common across our motor-representational complexes.  Instead, it 
seems as though the coordinated neural mirroring that characterizes much of the animal 
kingdom interacts, in human ontogeny, with a suite of more cognitively complicated 
capacities peculiar to human beings, resulting in our capacity to adopt the shared affective, 
cognitive, and practical stances that characterize so much of human life (cf. Butterfill 2018).  I 
suspect that shared intentionality in human beings is best conceived as the product of a 
process of evolutionary and educational development that includes not only neural mirroring 
but also the human proclivity to share attention, emotion, and a range of other 
affective/motivational states.   
While I leave this discussion behind in what follows, the central hypothesis suggested 
by the analogical reasoning below is meant to contribute to the empirical study of shared 
intentionality and norm psychology in human beings.  It does so by proposing one sense in 
which the form of cognition associated with the latter is more sophisticated than that of the 
former.  Toward that end, my terminology and framework is Michael Tomasello’s (2014).  
Tomasello argues for a two-stage process of evolution from early hominids to modern 
humans:  a stage of joint intentionality where dyads and small groups could share 
intentionality over spatio-temporally proximate kinetic behavior, and a stage of collective 




oneself as the member of an abstract community.  At this second stage, Tomasello contends, 
we have the (in-principle) universal sense of community that conditions our understanding of 
the true and the moral as that which constrains the thought and action of everyone.  
Tomasello notes that there may be additional stages between these two transition points from 
brute to civilization (2014:  151), and I can be read as positioning an intermediate stage in 
Tomasello’s framework, between the development of collective intentionality and the 
capacity to think about what is true and moral.  I do so by using the analogical reasoning 
below as a basis for re-examining some of the presuppositions of recent philosophical work 
on shared intentionality, and I defend the following hypothesis:  the intentional state of mind 
is a more physiologically primitive form of practical rationality than that which is 
characteristic of the deontic state of mind, so that intentional mental states are prior in the 
order of being to deontic mental states.  More specifically, I show that the need to distinguish 
the strong and weak deontic modal forces (e.g. ought and may) requires appealing to the 
notion of a single-minded choice attitude, which involves bearing attitudes both toward what 
one chooses and toward choices that are incompatible with what one chooses.  An animal able 
to think single-mindedly could then adopt an indifferent frame of mind as well, according to 
the notion of indifference defined below.  And with the choice attitudes of single-mindedness 
and indifference it is possible to model the planning mental states associated with the strong 
and weak deontic modalities.  The intentional modalities, by contrast, do not distinguish 
strong and weak modal forces, and so we can model the sentences giving voice to individual 
and shared intentions with planning states that make no appeal to the capacity to bear attitudes 
both toward what one does and toward choices incompatible with what one does.  The 
conclusion I draw—adding detail to Tomasello’s philosophical anthropology, and presented 
as a hypothesis for further examination—is that the transition from the joint intentionality of 




the development of a more sophisticated kind of practical cognition (the single-minded 
thinking that comes with deontic reasoning) than is necessary for the exercise of shared 
intentionality, whether joint or collective.  This fits remarkably well with a claim made in the 
closing paragraph of the review article by Schmidt and Rakoczy (2018:  698, emphasis 
added): 
So, one picture that is worth being explored more systematically in future research is that 
while humans and other species, notably primates, share basic forms of individual 
intentionality (and the corresponding natural norms of correctness and success), uniquely 
human forms of norm psychology and uniquely human forms of shared intentionality 
develop in close tandem in early ontogeny, the former building on and growing out of the 
latter. 
At the end of the essay I offer a second hypothesis suggested by this model:  we can 
understand individual intentions on the basis of our understanding of shared intentions rather 
than vice versa, so that while shared intentional mental states might be prior in the order of 
being to deontic mental states, shared intentional mental states are prior in the order of 
understanding to individually intentional ones.  In a sense to be explicated in below, original 
intentionality is the shared intentionality of a community.  That this is a theme resonant with 
certain ideas in modern philosophy will remain mostly undiscussed. 
 
III  Understanding the Intentional Modalities by Analogy with the Deontic Modalities 
Though not equivalent in all contexts, I will indifferently speak of sentences under an 
interpretation, of utterances, assertions, judgments, or claims, of mental states associated with 
utterances, and of propositional commitments.   
It is widely accepted that shared intentions, as a species of intention, are or involve 




discussion of Bratman’s view consonant with the one developed here see Butterfill 2015).  
Though it has not received much attention in the literature on shared intentionality, an 
expressivist planning semantics has been developed for the deontic modalities.  Gibbard 
(2003, chapters 3 and 4) and Stovall (Forthcoming B) offer the most precise formulations of 
this world-mind semantics, but it has its roots in a body of research Wilfrid Sellars began 
developing in the 1950s (e.g. 1951, 1963, 1966a, 1966b, 1967, chapter 7 of 1968, and 1976).  
The assertion of sentences falling under these modalities are interpreted as giving expression 
to plans of action concerning what one would do were one any member of a relevant group.  
In this regard deontic modality marks a capacity to put ourselves into different points of view 
within some community:  the claim that cooks ought to clean their knives when dirty 
expresses commitment to the plan to clean one’s knife in any situation in which one is a cook 
whose knife is dirty.  Just so, features of the world that constrain or are otherwise conditions 
for the satisfaction of these plans can be accounted for in terms of possible worlds.  The claim 
that my knife is dirty and I ought to wash it at once represents the world as being a particular 
way and expresses commitment to a plan to do something.   
In order to account for the difference between the strong deontic modalities (ought and 
forbidden) and the weak (may and may not), we must distinguish two ways of choosing:  
single-mindedly, whereby one rejects all choices incompatible with the choice one makes, and 
indifferently, whereby the agent is capable of choosing single-mindedly and there is at least 
one other choice incompatible with the choice made which could have been made without 
changing any of the agent’s single-minded choices (the capability to choose single-mindedly 
is a condition ensuring that non-human animals do not trivially count as choosing 
indifferently in the relevant sense).  In choosing indifferently one has rejected rejecting the 
choices one could have taken without changing one’s single-minded choices.  A version of 




half century, and it has not received the attention it deserves.  Sellars marks it in at least two 
places (1966b:  113-5 and 1976:  57), though he does not discuss it in detail.  Gibbard (2003 
chapter 3) then proposes it, but without reference to Sellars.  Finally Dreier (2006, 2009) 
advances a similar idea, also without referencing either Sellars or Gibbard.  Koons (2019:  
135) briefly discusses Sellars’ account of indifference and Silk (2015:  53 fn. 8) notes that 
many of Gibbard’s critics, by ignoring his discussion of this distinction, have not done justice 
to his view.  Each of Sellars, Gibbard, and Dreier speaks of preference rather than single-
mindedness as the contrast with indifference, but as any choice might be thought to exhibit 
one’s preferences—and as the relevant notion is the doubled-stance one adopts both toward 
what one chooses and toward choices incompatible with what one chooses—I prefer to speak 
in terms of single-mindedness (furthermore, the definition of indifference in terms of single-
mindedness is my own). 
The distinction between these two ways of choosing, and its role in a planning 
semantics for deontic judgments, can be appreciated through an example.  Suppose I am a 
cook who thinks I ought to wash my knife, that I may either wash it by hand or with the 
dishwasher, and that I ought not wash it with turpentine.  I am thereby in a state of mind of 
planning on single-mindedly choosing to wash my knife (rejecting not washing it), single-
mindedly choosing not to wash it with turpentine (rejecting washing it with turpentine), and 
indifferently choosing between washing it by hand or with the dishwasher (rejecting rejecting 
each of these choices).  Even where I have a general policy of washing knives by hand, if I 
regard both that action and use of the dishwasher as permitted then I am planning on 
indifferently choosing to do the former and not the latter, in the sense introduced above:  for I 
could just as well have chosen the latter without changing any of my single-minded choices.  
On the other hand, my choice to wash the knife by some means or other, as well as my choice 




choice incompatible with either of these choices while remaining of the same mind.  To 
choose indifferently among permitted actions each of which satisfies some single-minded 
choice is to discriminate practical species or determinations of a practical genus or 
determinable:  e.g., washing a knife by hand and with the dishwasher are practical species of 
the practical genus of knife washing, and cognitive grasp of that relationship is reflected in the 
practical capacity to distinguish the corresponding single-minded and indifferent choices.   
A semantics making use of these planning states offers a rigorous means for 
explicating the idea that descriptive sentences play a world-representing role while 
prescriptive sentences play an action-guiding or expressive role.  Consider a language L 
composed of descriptive sentences, prescriptive sentences, and constructions from these and 
the Boolean operators (in the interest of readability I generally ignore use/mention distinctions 
below).  Let a possible world w be defined as a maximally determinate state of affairs.  That 
is, for every atomic descriptive sentence datom ∈ L and every w, either datom is true at w or 
~datom is true at w (I will also speak of worlds as collections of facts or true propositions).  Let 
a deontic hyperplan hD be defined as a maximally consistent plan of action such that, for 
every circumstance C, every agent α able to make a choice at C, and every action A that α is 
able to choose to perform at C, either (exclusively):  
 
1) α single-mindedly chooses to A in C on hD; or 
2) α single-mindedly chooses not to A in C on hD; or 
3) α indifferently chooses to A in C on hD; or 





Let a deontic hyperstate <w, hD> be an ordered pair of a possible world and a deontic 
hyperplan (I will occasionally speak simply in terms of worlds and plans).5  With standard 
definitions for the Boolean operators, any sentence of L can be uniformly interpreted in terms 
of these hyperstates (see Forthcoming D for details).   
This hyperstate semantics can be straightforwardly extended to account for individual 
and shared intentions.  We do so by supplementing deontic hyperplans with intentional 
hyperplans (the need to keep two sets of books on planning will become clear in a moment).  
An intentional hyperplan hI ∈ HI is a maximally consistent plan of action such that, for every 
circumstance C, every agent α able to make a choice at C, and every action A that α is able to 
choose to perform at C, either (exclusively):  
 
1) α chooses to A in C on hI; or 
2) α chooses not to A in C on hI 
 
Because the intentional modalities do not distinguish a strong and a weak modal force, the 
distinction between single-mindedly and indifferently choosing to do something does not need 
to be marked in the plans that model intentional states.  In part V I will argue that this feature 
of the semantics, together with the joint fact that 1) single-minded and indifferent choices 
underlie the ability to mark off genus/species relations in practical reasoning, and 2) single-
minded and indifferent choice attitudes each require that an agent entertain attitudes toward 
classes of action that are incompatible with what one chooses, suggests that the capacity for 
shared intentionality is a more primitive form of the kind of practical rationality exhibited in 
deontic cognition.   
                                                          
5 I am treating the condition C that induces an action according to a plan as part of the planning content; it is also 
possible to model C with the world-content of hyperstates and treat intentions conditionally, e.g., “if in C, then 




A deontic-intentional hyperstate <w, hD, hI> ∈ SDI consists of a set of ordered triples 
of a world, a deontic hyperplan, and an intentional hyperplan.  Let sDI range over elements of 
SDI.  We use deontic-intentional hyperstates to semantically evaluate (mental states associated 
with) the utterances of descriptive, prescriptive, and intentional sentences as follows.  We 
denote the semantic interpretation of φ as [[φ]].  Descriptive sentences d are semantically 
evaluated as the worlds at which d is true: 
 
[[d]] =def. {<w, hD, hI>:  d is true at w} 
 
Read this as ‘the semantic value of the sentence d (under an interpretation) is the set of 
deontic-intentional hyperstates such that d is true at the world of those hyperstates’.  The 
mental states associated with utterances of the three kinds of atomic prescriptive sentences are 
evaluated as follows: 
 
“people are obliged to A in C” expresses universally rejecting not doing A in C 
[[people are obliged to A in C]] =def.. {<w, hD, hI>:  for every α, α single-mindedly 
chooses to A in C on hD} 
 
“people are forbidden to A in C” expresses universally rejecting doing A in C 
[[people are forbidden to A in C]] =def.. {<w, hD, hI>:  for every α, α single-mindedly 
chooses not to A in C on hD} 
 
“people are permitted to A in C” expresses universally rejecting rejecting doing A in C 
[[people are permitted to A in C]] =def.. {<w, hD, hI>:  for every α, α either single-





Because negation is interpreted as a complement operator on sets of hyperstates, the usual 
equivalences among what is obliged, what is permitted, and what is forbidden hold.   
To represent the contents of intentional sentences I use ‘ι’ as a metalinguistic variable 
taking either the first person singular or plural pronoun as its value.  Formally, the semantic 
value of “ι shall A in C” is the set of deontic-intentional hyperstates where everyone who is 
one of the group determined by the pronoun chooses to A in C in the corresponding 
intentional hyperplans:   
 
[[ι shall A in C]] =def.. {<w, hD, hI>:  ι choose to A in C on hI} 
 
Here a concern might be raised that this does not deliver the right result as an analysis of 
shared intentionality.  For there are cases where two people each want to do A in C, and want 
the other to do so, and yet do not share a plan.  For instance, you and I might each have a plan 
to paint a house with the other, yet one of us plans to deceive the other in some of the details.  
Here we do not share the intention to paint the house together, or share it in the right way. 
To avoid misclassifying such cases as instances where an intention is shared, in the 
literature on shared intentionality it is common to impose a requirement that the plans be 
executed in the right way.  This may include Bratman’s requirement that the plans ‘interlock’, 
Ludwig’s requirement that each agent’s plan include a specification of the plans of the other 
agents in the group, or Tuomela’s requirement that we-mode shared intentions are acted on in 
part because of or for the reason that the intention is shared.  In the interest of being as non-
committal about these debates as I can, my official view is that, in cases of shared 
intentionality, the adverb ‘together’ is used in the specification of the action content of the 




assume that this stands as a placeholder for the conditions someone like Bratman, Ludwig, or 
Tuomela might impose.  For present purposes I will also assume that whatever 
natural/scientific conditions satisfy togetherness in shared intentionality can serve here as well 
(cf. Butterfill 2018’s use of entrainment, motor-representation mirroring, task co-
representation, emergent coordination, collective goal-states and joint affordances as a basis 
for constructing a minimal theory of shared intentionality).  So long as these conditions do not 
presuppose a capacity for planning single-mindedly, that assumption will not undercut the 
inferences about ontological priority made below. 
We are now in a position to see how this plan-theoretic analysis of the deontic 
modalities supports an analogical understanding of shared intentionality.  For this is a view of 
moral reasoning as a capacity to put ourselves into the perspectives of other people and to 
consider how we would behave were we in their position.  That capacity may take effort to 
cultivate, as with the ability to enjoy the arts of a community we did not grow up in.  But 
insofar as we possess this capacity, we represent our community as one whose members we 
identify with in the practical sense that we think about their actions as, after a fashion, actions 
that we ourselves take part in.  The moral stance is the universalization of this transpersonal 
practical point of view, permuted through the category of single-mindedness.  To put the point 
in Kantian terms, the universal kingdom of ends is one whose members settle on what 
morality requires of them independently of their person and place in space and time, and they 
pursue that kingdom single-mindedly.  And on this semantics the transpersonal point of view 
is characteristic of shared intentionality as well.   
 
IV  A Commentary on the Model 
As with any analogy, it is important to note where the similarity breaks down.  In this section 




intentional, I discuss some of the ways they differ, and I show how these differences are 
represented in the semantics. 
As I am using the notions, it is possible to choose without choosing either single-
mindedly or indifferently.  For the single-minded choice attitude is one that involves adopting 
an attitude of rejection toward all actions incompatible with what one chooses, and this 
requirement is not in force when simply choosing to do something (similar remarks hold for 
indifference).  This is an idealization, of course, as we are at best approximate or partial 
hyperplanners.  Much of what we do is habitual and unreflective, and when we do reflect on 
our actions we are often motivated by all sorts of things that we either are not aware of, or are 
actively trying to ignore.  Still, our planning mental states can be modelled as approximations 
to what perhaps only the angels are capable of.  Because single-mindedness and indifference 
are needed to model the strong and the weak deontic modalities, and because the intentional 
modalities lack a strong and a weak modal force, one can satisfy a merely intentional plan 
without choosing either single-mindedly or indifferently.  At the same time, one way of 
making a choice is to choose single-mindedly (again, similarly for indifference).  It follows 
that one way of realizing one’s intentions is to do what one thinks one ought.  That is, every 
single-minded choice to A is a choice to A, and so such a choice satisfies the intentional plan 
to A.  But not every choice to A is single-minded, and so the mere fact that one chooses to A 
does not imply that one satisfies one’s deontic plans—we may say that the agent did the right 
thing, but not for the right reason (or in the right frame of mind).  This leaves open that the 
action may nevertheless be praiseworthy, as doing the right thing is often difficult enough on 
its own.  But there is special praise that comes with doing the right thing under the right 
attitude (think of the difference between the executive forced by a court of law to donate to 




The fact that choosing simpliciter can be satisfied without an agent adopting any 
consideration toward incompatible choices, whereas the single-minded and indifferent choice 
attitudes cannot, is one reason for distinguishing intentional hyperplans from deontic 
hyperplans in the hyperstates that model the contents of theoretical and practical cognition, 
and so specifying where the analogy between these forms of thought breaks down.  Another 
reason is provided by the following consideration.  As exercises of practical rationality, in 
general (and where there are no defeaters) one who utters “I ought to A in C”, just as one who 
utters “I shall A in C”, will be disposed to A in C.  But the two states of mind differ on the 
strength of the connection to the performance of the action in question, and we sublunary 
beings are characterized by the possibility of akrasia.  For this reason, “I ought to A in C and I 
shall not A in C”, though in some sense involving a kind of error in cognition, is not 
incoherent.  This is a regrettable, but understandable, state of mind.  The mental state 
associated with an assertion of this sentence is determined by the intersection of the two sets 
of deontic-intentional hyperstates determined by the two conjuncts, and owing to the fact that 
deontic and intentional sentences are evaluated relative to different sets of plans, there is a 
non-trivial semantic value for this mental state.  If deontic and intentional cognition were 
alike evaluated according to the same sets of plans, however, this conjunction would be 
incoherent as there would be no set of hyperstates that model it.  Nevertheless, there is a 
straightforward explanation for the practical irrationality of one who is in such a state:  given 
the plans that constitute the contents of the separate conjuncts, there is no choice one can 
make that satisfies everything one has planned.  Akrasia is therefore conceptually coherent, 
though practically irrational. 
Note that this semantics makes no appeal to superminds in accounting for the contents 
of shared intentions.  The only novel entities postulated are the plans that individual thinkers 




they have the capacity, individually, to put themselves into the perspectives of other people 
and plan from these different points of view.  That we are able to collectively have a plan in 
mind is a function of the fact that 1) plans are individuated relative to different agents and 2) 
we are able to consider how we would behave were we in various situations, including 
situations in which we are other people.  Thus, numerically identical planning-contents can be 
shared across minds.  But each point of evaluation at a plan is always the point of a single 
individual, so there is nothing in the semantics that commits us to anything but the mental 
states of individual people.   
 
V  A Hypothesis about Shared Intentionality and the Deontic Frame of Mind 
At the beginning of the essay I noted that Hegel associated analogical inference with the same 
syllogistic figure that Peirce labelled ‘hypothesis’ and later assimilated to abduction.  Both 
philosophers held that reasoning in this mode allows for changing the way we understand 
some target of inquiry, and they thought that a study of the operation of this reflective 
spontaneity (to think the idea in Kantian terms) was essential for future intellectual and social 
development.  Just so, this analogical conception of the relationship between shared 
intentionality and deontic reasoning allows us to rethink our understanding of the relationship 
between individual and shared intentionality.  In part II I suggested that some of the empirical 
work on shared intentionality and norm psychology supports my proposal; here I want to 
indicate how the empirical work might in turn be informed by this view.  Despite not forcing 
our hand, the analysis does raise some intriguing hypotheses. 
For instance, it falls out of my account that while moral reasoning and shared 
intentionality are of a common kind, the former involves a more fine-grained capacity for 
exercising practical rationality than is needed for the latter.  To reason in a deontic frame of 




differs from merely choosing to do A insofar as it requires that one also bear a negative 
attitude toward actions that are incompatible with so choosing.  Simply choosing to do A, 
however, amounts to stumping for A, and that choice can be made without regard to 
incompatible alternatives.6  This conclusion is reinforced by a feature of practical rationality 
noted above.  The ability to discriminate the indifferent choice from the single-minded choice 
is the ability to mark off the practical species or determinations that instantiate a practical 
genus or determinable.  That is to say our theoretically rational capacity to make the deontic 
judgments we do is conditioned by our practically rational capacity to mark off genus/species 
or determinable/determination relations in agency.  For an agent can only comprehend the 
requirement to do the right thing insofar as she is aware of what counts as ‘the right thing’, 
and in most of the contexts we face there are many ways of acting so as to satisfy this 
requirement.  The world being the multifaceted thing it is, then, one can only plan from a 
deontic point of view insofar as one has the capacity to distinguish practical genera and their 
species, and this is conditioned by our ability to adopt single-minded and indifferent practical 
stances. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that a language of intentionality can be used to specify 
positive and negative reinforcement behaviors sufficient to habituate the members of a 
community into norm obedience of the sort expressed with the deontic modalities.  And this 
can be done without presupposing that the individuals whose behaviors are shaped by this 
process have the capacity to discriminate single-mindedness from indifference—indeed, even 
the ones instituting this behavior might not be capable of explicit deontic reasoning.  Where 
‘stickbeating’ and ‘flocktending’ refers respectively to negative and positive behavioral 
                                                          
6 For Hegel, this marks the difference between the merely desirous animal kingdom and the spiritual domain of 
human beings.  When presented with food the mere animal will “fall to without ceremony and eat” (1977:  65— 
see the discussion in Brandom 2019:  240-3).  We creatures of Spirit, on the other hand, are able to invest the 
world with value-laden significance, ceremonial or otherwise—food and drink are not merely ingested, but may 





reinforcement, and understood on supposition that the hominids who were undergoing this 
conditioning shared a form of life (an affective/cognitive/practical stance toward a common 
environment), we have:7   
 
- acting on the intention to stickbeat doing A in C and flocktend not doing A in C is one 
way of training people to conform to the norm that A is forbidden in C 
 
- acting on the intention to stickbeat not doing A in C and flocktend doing A in C is one 
way of training people to conform to the norm that A is obliged in C 
 
- acting on the intention to neither stickbeat doing A in C and nor flocktend not doing A 
in C is one way of training people to conform to the norm that A is permitted in C 
 
It may be that the ability to recognize that something is obliged, permitted, or forbidden 
requires the ability to distinguish single-minded from indifferent choices.  That is to say, self-
consciousness may require the resources of deontic cognition.  Nevertheless, the ability to 
conform to the norms governing what is obliged, permitted, and forbidden can be instituted 
within a community simply on the basis of behavior specifiable in terms of intentions 
unmarked by the distinction between single-mindedness and indifference.  This again 
suggests that the merely intentional state of mind, whether individual or shared, is a more 
primitive form of cognition than that which attends deontic mental states.  To return to 
Tomasello’s philosophical anthropology, the hypothesis I am proposing—as a further 
specification of his account of the development of truth- and morality-tracking cognition from 
joint and then collective intentionality—is that a capacity for single-mindedness and 
                                                          




indifference had to emerge between the evolution of collective intentionality and the 
appearance of discursive theoretical and practical rationality.  And I am suggesting that, 
nevertheless, shared intentional habit-shaping acculturating practices could have driven the 
development of a selection pressure in favor of that capacity among human beings, who could 
thereby more effectively control the development of the norms that bind them together.  
 
VI  Understanding Individual Intentionality by Analogy with Shared Intentionality 
A second hypothesis raised by this framework concerns the status of shared intentions vis à 
vis individual intentions.  It is generally held that individually intentional mental states are 
more basic than shared intentional mental states, with philosophers scaling up and 
supplementing the latter in the interest of explaining the former.  By shifting to an analysis of 
the states of mind expressed with the language of the intentional modalities, and 
understanding these on the basis of a planning semantics for the deontic modalities, we arrive 
at a different view on the relationship between shared and individual intentions.  For from the 
standpoint arrived at here it is more parsimonious to understand individual intentionality by 
analogy with shared intentionality rather than vice versa.  Starting with the notion of a shared 
intentional state as a collection of hyperstates that are general with regard to the agents whose 
choices are planned, the mental state constituting an individual intention can be understood as 
the localization of that general set of plans to a single agent.  Rather than seeing the shared 
intentional state of mind as an expansion of the individually intentional state of mind, we can 
see the individually intentional state of mind as a contraction of the shared intentional one.  
On this analysis, the universally practically-rational point of view is the conceptual foundation 
for the practically-rational mental states that express senses of self that are localized to 
particular communities (e.g. cooks), with the individual point of view as the limit of this 




This hypothesis can be understood as one way of spelling out the idea that the shared 
intention is the locus of original intentionality within a community of rational beings.  
Regarding metaphysics or ontology, the only minds in play are those of the individual 
members of different communities.  This is to say that the individual intention may be prior to 
the shared intention in the order of being (just as the shared intention, I have argued, is prior 
in being to deontic cognition).  But in the order of understanding, as reflected in a hyperstate 
semantics for statements that give expression to intentions, it proves simpler to suppose that 
shared intentionality is basic and to define the mental state of an individual intention as a 
special case of the former (just as a planning semantics originally developed for the deontic 
modalities was positioned above as prior in the order of understanding to a planning 
semantics for intentionality).  This line of thinking provides some support for the supposition 
that modern philosophy’s interest in Spirit or the General Will was a conceptual advance over 
pre-modern notions of individual and shared agency.  And, if the first hypothesis is correct, 
then this analogical investigation into the metaphysics of practical rationality helped discover 
something new about the nature of Spirit:  viz., that in the order of being the shared intention 
is prior to deontic cognition. 
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